THE CIVIL WAR IN LOUISIANA: GENERAL BANKS’ FAILED RED RIVER CAMPAIGN OF 1864

By

Michael Antonio Modica, B.G.S.

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of The University of Houston Clear Lake in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS

THE UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON CLEAR LAKE December, 1999

Copyright 1999, Michael Antonio Modica All Rights Reserved
ABSTRACT

THE CIVIL WAR IN LOUISIANA: GENERAL BANKS’ FAILED RED RIVER CAMPAIGN OF 1864

Michael Antonio Modica, M.A.
The University of Houston Clear Lake, 1999

Thesis Chair: Bruce Palmer, Ph.D.

Compared to the states in the Eastern Theater, Louisiana’s Civil War experience seems almost non-existent. The campaigns that were attempted by the Union Army were, for the most part, very successful. Within 3 years they managed to occupy ¼ of the state and control its largest port city. The one failure for the Union Army occurred when General Nathaniel P. Banks ascended the Red River with the goal of capturing Shreveport. The campaign ended in disaster for Banks and his Department of the Gulf Army and became one of the few Confederate victories in the Western Theater.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

1. The Purpose of the Expedition.....................................................1
2. The Plan..................................................................................11
3. The Campaign Begins.............................................................21
4. The Battles
   The Battle of Sabine Crossroads
   (Mansfield)............................................................................37
   The Battle of Pleasant Hill......................................................49
5. The Retreat.............................................................................59
   Naval Problems......................................................................60
   Monett’s Ferry.......................................................................67
   Bailey’s Dam.........................................................................68
   Mansura and Yellow Bayou..................................................73
6. The End Result.......................................................................81

REFERENCES...............................................................................94
APPENDICES

Breakdown of Federal and Confederate Army Structure..............................................................101

List of Military Ranks with abbreviations..............103

Confederate Orders of Battle.........................................................104

Union Orders of Battle.................................................................107
LIST OF TABLES

Table.

1. The results of the campaign.................................................................83
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure.

1. Eastern Region of the Trans-Mississippi Department........................................................................5
2. Red River Campaign Map........................................................................................................18
3. Campaign Map..................................................................................................................24
4. Fort DeRussy Blue Print......................................................................................................26
5. The Confederate Assault at the Battle of Mansfield......................................................................41
6. Mouton’s assault on the Union Right..................................................................................44
7. The 1st Phase of the Battle of Pleasant Hill..................................................................55
8. The 2nd Phase of the Battle of Pleasant Hill..................................................................57
9. Banks’ route in and out of Louisiana................................................................................61
10. The location of Lt. Col. Bailey’s Dam..........................................................................71
11. Bailey’s Dam...................................................................................................................72
12. 1st Phase of the Battle of Yellow Bayou...........................................................................75
13. 2nd Phase of the Battle of Yellow Bayou...........................................................................77
14. 3rd Phase of the Battle of Yellow Bayou...........................................................................79
CHAPTER 1

PURPOSE OF THE EXPEDITION

In the spring of 1864, the Federal Government undertook a military expedition into north Louisiana up the Red River. Its goal was to capture the state capital at Shreveport. Shreveport was a part of the route between Richmond, Virginia, and Texas. It was a commercial center from which Southern cotton was shipped to Mexico in exchange for gold and supplies. The Federal Government knew the strategic importance of Shreveport, with its close proximity to Texas and the supplies that state housed. Texas was also seen as a possible staging point for any foreign intervention or aid that might help the Confederate cause, and the Federal Government knew that if foreign intervention occurred, the logical route would bring the troops through East Texas and into Shreveport on their way to the east. These things, Louis Napoleon’s establishment in Mexico of a puppet state under Maximilian, and Napoleon’s pronounced leaning toward recognition of
the Confederacy, caused a good deal of uneasiness and concern with Shreveport in Washington.

By 1864 Shreveport had a thriving war-based industry. With little or no help coming from the Confederate states east of the Mississippi River, she had to be self-sufficient. Fortunately the region had enough natural resources to pursue this. Within the city limits, Shreveport had at least one foundry, a powder house, an arsenal, two sawmills, and corn storage sheds, all of which were located along the south bank of the Red River near Cross-Bayou.¹

This industry served two purposes. First, it supported the Confederate army in the region. Second, it supported the naval construction and repair yard located on Cross-Bayou. The Confederates built the ironclad C.S.S. Missouri there. They also repaired the high-speed ram C.S.S. William S. Webb after the capture of the U.S.S. Indianola.² Because of the strategic importance of Shreveport to the Confederate Government and the situation in Texas, the Federal Government felt it necessary to occupy both, Texas and Shreveport by any means possible.

¹ Gary Joiner, Manuscript of “Invitation To A Ball: Confederate Defenses on the Red River 1863-1864”, 5-6.
² Ibid., 6.
On March 7, 1863, Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith arrived in Alexandria, Louisiana and took formal command of the Trans-Mississippi Department of the Confederacy. Kirby Smith was born on May 16, 1824, in Florida. As a child he was aggressive, lively, and troublesome. He also demonstrated mental development above his age level. In 1841 he was admitted to West Point, following his oldest brother, a 1826 member of the “Long Grey Line.” While at West Point, he continued to excel in his academics, earning “First Rate” on his semester reports. He excelled in Math, which he considered his favorite subject, and struggled in Latin, his least favorite subject.

Upon his graduation from West Point, he was assigned to the 5th Regiment of Infantry under General Zachary Taylor and his Mexican Expedition. In 1849, he returned to West Point as an instructor of 3rd year Mathematics and was promoted to the rank of Captain. He found opportunity as an instructor rather dismal compared to his regimental duties.

---


5 Ibid., 41, 72.
His tenure as Professor of Mathematics lasted only three years. In 1852, he was reassigned to the regimental level at Ringgold Barracks, on the Rio Grande across from Carmargo, Mexico. He remained on the Mexican frontier until the start of the Civil War.⁶

The outbreak of the Civil War put Smith at a crossroads. He had to choose, like all soldiers and sailors in the Navy and Army, to remain loyal to the United States or to his particular state. In March 1861, Smith made his decision and resigned his commission as a Major in the U.S. Army and accepted the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Confederate Army. Before coming to Louisiana Smith served in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia.⁷

The Trans-Mississippi Department controlled all of the Confederate territories west of the Mississippi and stretched as far west as the Arizona territory and as far north as Missouri. (See Figure 1) In April 1863, General Smith moved the Headquarters of the Department from Alexandria to Shreveport because of Union activity.⁸ Smith had another reason for selecting Shreveport. It was centrally located within his command. He immediately began

---

⁶ Ibid., 76-77.
⁷ Ibid.
establishing lines of communication between Shreveport, Monroe, Louisiana, and Little Rock.\(^9\)

![Figure 1. The Eastern Region of the Trans-Mississippi Department.\(^{10}\)](image)

When General Smith took command he made few changes. He decided to keep General Richard Taylor, son of former United States President Zachary Taylor and son-in-law of the Confederate President Jefferson Davis, in charge of the

\(^9\) Parks, 259.

\(^{10}\) Kerby, 7.
Louisiana district and General James Magruder in command of the Texas district.

Among Smith’s key staff members was a recently promoted Brigadier General, William R. Boggs, who had been with Smith in Kentucky. Smith gave Boggs the task of creating a defensive system on the Red River and its tributaries. With Boggs’ support, Smith began to employ slave labor as early as September, 1863, to construct forts. Boggs was a West Point product, Class of 1853. He studied under Denis Mahan, Professor of Military and Civil Engineering. In his Treatise on Field Fortifications, Containing Instructions on the Methods of Laying Out, Constructing, Defending and Attacking Entrenchments, With General Outlines Also of The Arrangement, the Attack and Defense of Permanent Fortifications, first published in 1836, Mahan laid the groundwork for field fortification design that was used well into the war. Boggs’ fortifications, erected throughout Louisiana, reflected his training under Mahan.

The Federal presence in Louisiana was represented by

---

11 Ibid., 253.
12 Ibid.
13 Joiner, 8
General Nathaniel P. Banks, who was appointed commander of the Federal Department of the Gulf in large part because of pressure put on President Lincoln by New England manufacturers.\textsuperscript{14} Their motives were more personal and financial than patriotic. They knew that with the capture of Louisiana’s Red River valley they would be able to obtain vast supplies of cotton for their factories.\textsuperscript{15} Banks needed the support of those manufacturers. He was considering a run for the Presidency against Lincoln during the next election and knew he would need a large amount of support in terms of funds and political favors. Banks’ father had been a factory supervisor at a textile mill, so he knew the importance of it to the Northeast. Banks had been a member of the Massachusetts State bar and eventually became a state legislator. He also had served as Speaker of the House in The United States Congress, United States Congressman, and prior to the outbreak was serving as the state’s Governor.\textsuperscript{16}

As a military leader Banks lacked ability. In May of 1861, he was appointed Major General of Volunteers and assigned command of V Corps of the Army of the Potomac.


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 31.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
Once on the battlefield his inability became obvious.

Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson defeated Banks in the Shenandoah Valley. After a few more defeats he was reassigned to Commander of the Defenses around Washington D.C. From there he was transferred to the Federal Department of the Gulf, where he captured Port Hudson.

The occupation of Louisiana had started with the fall of New Orleans in May 1862, to then-Captain David Farragut. After the fall of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, and Port Hudson on the 8th, forces of the Federal Department of the Gulf started planning an operation to capture Texas. Commanding the operation would be General Banks.

General Halleck, General-in-Chief of the Union forces, had been looking at an expedition into Texas for some time, one that would move "up the Red River to release the cotton and sugar of that area and to establish a base for an advance into Texas."

After the fall of Vicksburg, President Lincoln wrote to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton: "Can we not renew the effort to organize a force to go to Western Texas?"

The following week on August 5th, Lincoln wrote General Banks that "Recent events in Mexico, I think, render early action in Texas more important than

---

17 O.R. 25, 590.
18 O.R. 36, 59.
General Halleck considered a land expedition up the Red River the proper approach to an attack on Texas, while General Banks was inclined toward an approach from the sea. Halleck wrote:

It is suggested that having the Red River in our possession, it would form the best base for operations in Texas....By adopting the line of the Red River you retain your connection with your own base....Moreover, you cut Northern Louisiana and Southern Arkansas entirely off from supplies and re-enforcement's from Texas.  

Halleck's plan to divide and conquer Arkansas and Louisiana and cut it off from the Eastern Theater of the war was not in itself a bad plan. It would have accomplished its desired end provided Halleck had chosen a more capable commander. In August he telegraphed Banks, reiterating the importance of Texas: "There are important reasons why our flag should be hoisted in some point of Texas with the least possible delay."  

On September 5, 1863, Banks dispatched an operation, led by gunboats, and commanded by Major General W.B. Franklin, to capture the mouth of the Sabine River. Although the operation was a complete failure, it did not

---

19 Ibid., 384.
21 Ibid.
warn Banks off an approach to Texas from the sea. Knowing military victories would almost assure his rise of political status, he quickly dispatched another expedition under Major General W.J.T. Dana with orders to seize and gain control of the mouth of the Rio Grande. General Banks, eager to prove himself to his Commander-in-Chief, commanded this mission himself. They sailed from New Orleans on October 26, 1863, and by the end of November his expedition had occupied the entire coast of Texas except the mouth of the Rio Brazos and Galveston Island.

This paper victory for Banks may have given him a false sense of security in his military ability. A land invasion, over rough terrain, in humid weather, is much more difficult than an operation by sea. This is something that Banks would find out by the end of his campaign.

---


23 Ibid., 421.
CHAPTER 2

THE PLAN

Banks’ success along the coast did not convince General Halleck that there was an alternative to a land invasion. It seems that Halleck was more concerned with the assets that were housed in Shreveport than anything along the Texas coast. On January 16th, Banks, under constant pressure and with an overwhelming desire to please his superiors succumbed to Halleck’s opinion. He wrote on January 23, 1863, to General Halleck:

I concur in your opinion, and with Generals Sherman and Steele (Commander of the Federal District of Arkansas), that the Red River is the shortest and best line of defense for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas, but it would be too much for Major General Steele or myself to undertake separately.24

Banks again agreed on February 25th to operate in conjunction with General William T. Sherman and General Fredrick Steele against Shreveport.25 Banks could have been

25 Ibid., 325.
looking ahead to confiscating the cotton that was rumored to be hidden along the banks of the Red River. He saw this as the perfect opportunity to build political support.

On March 1st, Sherman met with Banks in New Orleans to discuss the operation. After learning that Banks was going to command the expedition, Sherman refused to go. He did promise to send 10,000 of his best men and a naval flotilla commanded by Admiral David D. Porter with orders to join Banks in Alexandria on March 17th.\(^{26}\)

When General Kirby Smith heard of General Sherman’s visit with General Banks, he was convinced that the two would cooperate in a drive up the Red River. General Richard Taylor, Commander of the Louisiana District, had only 7,000 men in his Louisiana district and was in desperate need of reinforcements.\(^{27}\)

Taylor was born in Kentucky in 1826. His father, President Zachary Taylor, believed in a quality education and sent Richard to private schools, including Yale. Prior to the war, Taylor operated his father’s estate in Mississippi and his own sugar plantation in Louisiana.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 326.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 327.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, Taylor left his plantation and accepted a commission in the Confederate Army. As a colonel he was given the position of Commander of the 9th Louisiana Infantry.\(^{28}\)

Taylor’s military career was unusually exceptional. In his four years of service to the Confederate Government, he was never involved with a disaster or defeat. His quick advance through the Confederate ranks was a testament to his ability. After the Confederate victory at the 1st Bull Run, he was promoted to Brigadier General.\(^{29}\) He served as a Brigade Commander under General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson in his Shenandoah Valley Campaign. His performance in the field earned him a promotion to Major General.\(^{30}\)

In 1863, Taylor was transferred to the Trans-Mississippi Department and given command of the Louisiana District. Once in Louisiana, Taylor wasted no time in showing his military prowess. While General Banks was laying siege to Port Hudson and General Grant was besieging Vicksburg, Taylor embarked on a campaign into the LaFourche region of South-Central Louisiana with the purpose of relieving pressure on Port Hudson. The plan was to draw


\(^{29}\) Ibid., 23.

troops from New Orleans to pursue his army thereby causing Banks to reinforce New Orleans with troops from Port Hudson.

His plan was noble, but its result was a failure. Although the blockade that the Confederates managed to put near New Orleans was effective and caused a great deal of concern, it was too late. Confederate Theater commanders Joseph E. Johnston and Kirby Smith hampered Taylor even more. Johnston failed to place a significant force to Banks’ rear and Smith, wanting to relieve Vicksburg, and ending up doing nothing, refused to sacrifice men and supplies to Taylor’s operation. Kirby Smith’s failure to aid either Taylor or Pemberton at Vicksburg caused Taylor to resent his commander. He felt that if Smith had given him enough men, Port Hudson would have been returned to the Confederacy. Taylor would harbor ill feeling about this until he was transferred from Smith’s command.

Smith, anticipating Banks’ moves up the Red River and knowing his department was undermanned started consolidating all of his available forces. On March 5th, General Thomas Greene’s Division was ordered by General Taylor to move from Texas into Louisiana. The next day,

Taylor also ordered General J.B. Magruder to send all of his available troops to Louisiana from Texas. On March 7th, General Camille Polignac was instructed by Taylor to move his brigade from Texas to Louisiana without delay.  

Meanwhile, after putting his support behind Halleck’s plan, General Banks opened a line of communication with General Steele, Commander of the Department of Arkansas, and Admiral Porter, Commander of the Mississippi Squadron, for the purpose of developing a coordinated plan of attack up the Red River. General Steele was worried that he would not be able to mobilize his forces in March as Banks wished. Steele sent a dispatch to Banks explaining his delay:

I did not anticipate being called upon to move so early....Several of my veteran regiments are on furlough, several others are demanding that the promises under which they enlisted be fulfilled.  

Apparently General Steele had allowed several of his units to go home and was unprepared for what was asked of him.

Steele had other concerns as well. An election of state officials that was going to delay him more:

An election of State officers is ordered for the 14th proximo, and the President is very

---

32 Winters, 327.

anxious it should be a success. Without the assistance of the troops to distribute the poll-books, with the oath of allegiance, and to protect the voters at the polls, it cannot succeed.\textsuperscript{34}

General Sherman did not believe that the state elections were of the same importance as military actions: "If we have to modify military plans for civil elections, we had better go home."\textsuperscript{35} It was only after General Grant had sent a telegraph to General Steele explaining the importance of the operation that Steele mustered up enough troops. Grant instructed Steele:

Move your forces in full co-operation with General N.P. Banks' attack on Shreveport. A mere demonstration will not be sufficient. Now that a large force has gone up Red River it is necessary that Shreveport and the Red River should come into our possession.\textsuperscript{36}

The campaign had three objectives. The first was to destroy the Confederate army that was protecting Louisiana and Texas. The second, imposed by Washington, was to occupy East Texas and Shreveport. The third objective was more important to Banks than the other two. There were thousands of bales of cotton stashed along the banks of the Red River.\textsuperscript{37} That cotton, if shipped to the right

\textsuperscript{34} O.R. 34, pt.2, 448.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 516.

\textsuperscript{36} Joiner and Vetter, 33; O.R. 34, pt. 2, 616.

factories, could help secure financial support for a future Presidential run against Lincoln.

The plan, devised by both Generals Halleck and Banks, looked simple on paper: A joint land-naval force under the command of General Banks and Admiral Porter would ascend the Red River toward Shreveport while General Steele marched 15,000 troops south from Little Rock and Fort Smith into North Louisiana. In a pincer movement, Steele and Banks would capture and occupy Shreveport.\(^{38}\) (See Figure 2) Combined, Banks’ and Porter’s forces would number 30,000 men, plus 22 ironclads and tinclads with 60 transports and quartermaster vessels.

These forces included 10,000 veterans of General Sherman’s XVI and XVIII corps, under the command of Brigadier General Andrew Smith.\(^{39}\) Sherman had picked Smith knowing that “he would fully cooperate with the Navy in the most energetic manner.”\(^{40}\) Sherman had two stipulations regarding the use of his troops: “They could not advance further than Shreveport, and they had to be returned to his command on or about April 15, 1864.”\(^{41}\)

---


\(^{39}\) Ibid., 15.

\(^{40}\) Joiner and Vetter, 33.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.
From Bank's own department came two divisions from the XII corps, plus Brigadier General Albert L. Lee's cavalry Division of 4000 troopers. The advancing force had field artillery as well as 200 pieces with the Naval flotilla. Because Banks was uncertain of Confederate strength in the area, he ordered that operations at Galveston be suspended and General Cameron's and General Ransom's Divisions of the XIII corps called back to join General Franklin, one of General Banks' Corps commanders,

---


43 Holmes, 15.
on the Teche Bayou in South Louisiana. The War Department, realizing that a large cavalry force would be needed for the campaign, sent seven new cavalry regiments from the Northern and Eastern Theaters.\textsuperscript{44}

Halleck’s plan might have worked had it been well coordinated, but he failed to appoint a single commander with authority over the combined force. As Banks remarked after the war, “The difficulty in regard to this expedition was that nobody assumed to give orders; each commander acted for himself.”\textsuperscript{45} Halleck was so vague in his orders that Banks, Smith, Steele, and Porter had difficulty determining whether Halleck had given them orders or merely suggestions.\textsuperscript{46}

The fact that the expedition started late should have been an omen regarding its impending failure. On March 10, 1864, General Banks, in a letter to Adm. Porter stated:

> It was my intention to march from that place [Franklin, La] so as to reach Alexandria on the 17\textsuperscript{th} instant, but a violent rainstorm, which commenced night before last, and here yesterday, has placed the roads in such conditions as to make a march impracticable for at least four days.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{44} Winters, 326.

\textsuperscript{45} O.R. 34, pt.2, 15-16, 41-42, 55-56, 293-294; Joint Committee on the Conduct of War, 19.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.

Participation of the fleet also required that the river be in flood, but very little rise in the river occurred in the spring of 1864 because of a below average rainfall during the early spring. There was just enough water on March 11th to allow the larger boats to enter the river. For the naval aspect of the operation to be successful they had to reach the Red River when it was at its highest level. Without the naval support, Banks and his army would be without the benefit of cover from the naval guns and be left vulnerable to Confederate raids. The fact that the campaign went ahead as planned, despite already being behind schedule, is an example of Banks' poor planning, poor campaign decisions, and ignorance of the countryside in which he marched.

---

CHAPTER 3

THE CAMPAIGN BEGINS

Despite the early problems that Banks and his expedition faced, on March 10 the campaign got under way from points along the Mississippi River. Detachments of the XVI and XVIII Army Corps left Vicksburg on transports, under the command of General A.J. Smith. The expedition passed into the Atchafalaya River through the old mouth of the Red River and landed in Simmesport.\footnote{Ibid., 425.}

On the 11\textsuperscript{th} Smith was notified by courier that Banks’ column had been delayed by bad weather. Both he and Porter conferred about their current situation and what to expect up-river. Porter informed Smith about Ft. DeRussy, located seven miles upstream from the mouth of the Red River, and its tributaries, for the defense of the Confederate territory. He also told him of the blockade halfway between the mouth of the Red River and Alexandria.
They both knew that before the gunboats and transports could proceed to Alexandria, the fortifications had to be taken and kept in Union control.\(^{50}\)

Porter immediately sent nine of his gunboats into the Atchafalaya, followed by Smith’s transports. The remaining four boats—Eastport, Osage, Fort Hindman, and Cricket—proceeded up the Red to remove the river obstructions.\(^{51}\)

Admiral Selfridge, Commander of the Osage, recorded that the obstructions consisted of

Two lines of heavy piling well braced together, extended completely across the river, and were protected on the downstream side by a raft of heavy timber, partly on the bottom.\(^{52}\)

Their orders were to clear the obstruction and await the arrival of the troops, or until Porter could come up, before they bombarded Fort DeRussy. Although the Confederates were short on supplies and men, they made do with what materials they had and tried to impede any river advance by Union forces into North Louisiana.

On the morning of the 13\(^{th}\) General Smith dispatched two Divisions of the XVI Army Corps, under the command of Brigadier General Joseph Mower, to gather information on

\(^{50}\) Winters, 328.

\(^{51}\) Ibid; Thomas O. Selfridge, Memoirs of Thomas O. Selfridge (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1924), 94.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.
enemy troop movement in the area.\textsuperscript{53} Three miles from where they left the ships, General Mower came upon a Confederate Brigade commanded by General William Scurry. Scurry and his men were in the process of constructing a fortification. Using the element of surprise, Mower’s men charged the stunned Confederates. After giving chase for two miles, Mower was able to capture six of their wagons, with supplies, and twenty prisoners.\textsuperscript{54} That night General Smith left the landing and camped out for the night four miles above Simmesport.\textsuperscript{55}

The next morning around 3 a.m., General Smith resumed his march towards Fort DeRussy. The fort had been constructed in 1863 and refitted in early 1864. Located in the town of Marksville in Avoyelles Parish, it was the only Confederate defensive position between the Mississippi River and Alexandria. On his march to Fort DeRussy, Smith had to construct a bridge at Mansura to replace the one that the Confederates had destroyed. Once his troops crossed the bridge intact, he continued his advance towards DeRussy.

\textsuperscript{53} O.R. 34, pt.1, 304.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 305; Ware, 15.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
General Smith had been aware of a Confederate Division, commanded by General Walker, moving about his flank and ordered scouts to patrol the countryside. Not wanting to risk his column early in the campaign, he halted

---

the advance of his column 1½ miles below the fort.\textsuperscript{57}

The fort of 350 men were part of a garrison that Mower surprised the day before. General Boggs had constructed the fort according to the designs of the period. He wrote to Taylor:

I would suggest a diamond shape, with four bastions; the parapet should be at least 40 feet thick and 12 feet high with a wide deep ditch around...with four or five chaines of railroad iron under the guns of the works.\textsuperscript{58}

Fort DeRussy itself was not defended adequately. It had only four pieces of artillery, including a 9 inch Dahlgren gun and a 32 pound parrot rifle. It also had a casemate and several batteries with six other pieces of artillery, including an additional 9 inch Dahlgren along the riverbank and a large bombproof in the north end of the fort. For a vital position in the mouth of the Red River, this was just a token defense. General Taylor had always been against using field fortifications to house troops. He felt they would only trap his men.\textsuperscript{59}

Because of uncertainty about what General Walker was doing, General A.J. Smith only dispatched two of his

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{58} O.R. 26, pt.2, 332; Joiner, 10. The author has had the pleasure of working on an archeological excavation of the fort as it stands today. The fact that the parapets are intact 135 years after this battle should attest to the Confederate engineering.

\textsuperscript{59} Joiner, 11.
Brigades to advance on the fort. His men, commanded by General Mower, were to advance on Fort DeRussy with the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the 3rd Division, XVI Army Corps, in a line of battle, with skirmishers well to the front. Mower kept his 3rd Brigade within supporting distance in case Walker attacked his position.

Figure 4. Fort DeRussy Engagement. Note the Union troops to the Southwest of the Fort.\footnote{O.R. 34, pt.1, 221.}
As soon as Smith’s lines came within sight of the fort they were fired upon by Confederate artillery in the fort. Smith gave his men the order to charge at 6:30 p.m., sending his 1st and 2nd Brigades advancing under heavy enemy fire. Twenty minutes after the order to charge was given, Smith’s infantry scaled the parapets, forcing the Confederates to surrender. In his report, General Smith wrote:

Our loss was 3 killed, 35 wounded….We captured 319 prisoners, 10 pieces of artillery and a large quantity of ordinance….Among the pieces taken were 2 nine inch Dahlgren guns….Of the pieces captured 4 were in the fort and 6 in the water battery, 400 yards from the fort.61

While Smith’s troops were scaling the parapets at Fort DeRussy, the remaining gunboats worked at clearing the river obstruction. Selfridge had the piles near the banks removed first, causing a rush of water to break through, assisting with the removal of the remaining piles. It only took twelve hours to clear the Confederate obstruction enough to allow the four gunboats to proceed up river.62

Due to the obstructions in the river the gunboat fleet did not arrive until after the fort had fallen. Smith and Porter did not remain at the fort long enough to enjoy

61 Ibid., 305-306.
62 Selfridge, 94-95.
their first victory of the campaign. They loaded up the fleet and continued their mission towards Alexandria. General Smith left General T. Kilby Smith at the fort to oversee its destruction. After the fort had been destroyed, General Kilby Smith and his column marched to Alexandria to await the fleet and the forces of General Banks. With the capture and destruction of Fort DeRussy the most serious obstacle to the Union forces had been removed, opening up the Red River as far as Alexandria.

On March 16th, General Mower, marching ahead of General Smith’s main column, arrived in Alexandria. He found signs that the Confederates had evacuated the town hurriedly. General Smith arrived shortly thereafter, taking charge of the town and all its provisions until the arrival of General Banks. On the 21st, Smith ordered General Mower to scout the area around Alexandria up to Henderson’s Hill and to clear any enemy forces out between Bayou Rapides and the Red River. That day Mower captured a courier with messages from General Taylor and learned that a Confederate Cavalry Regiment and a Battery of artillery was positioned at Henderson Hill. Mower, with two Regiments of his

---

64 Ibid.
65 Ware, 17.
infantry, a battery of artillery and a section of cavalry, advanced and attacked the Confederates from the rear. Using the element of surprise he captured 262 men, four guns, and a large amount of supplies without a shot being fired. On March 23rd he returned to Alexandria with his command intact and his captured Confederate men and equipment.67

A cavalry force commanded by General Lee, the advance guard of General Franklin’s forces, arrived in Alexandria on March 19th and 20th. The following week, Brigadier General Stone, Chief of Staff for General Banks, and other members of the command staff arrived in Alexandria, with Banks himself arriving on the steamer U.S.S. Black Hawk on the 24th.68

When Banks arrived in Alexandria he was furious to learn that Admiral Porter had been searching the interior for cotton. Porter was claiming the cotton that Banks had earmarked for the northern factories he favored. Porter wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, that he captured 2,021 bales of rebel cotton.69 Since he had no authority to stop Porter’s activities, Banks could

66 O.R. 34, pt.1, 307; Ware, 18.
67 Ibid., 307.
68 Winters, 331; Ware, 19.
69 O.R.N. 26, pt.2, 35.
only try to beat him to the remaining cotton. Federal legislation with respect to wartime trade had specifically left intact naval prize law.

To Banks’ dismay, Porter and his sailors had commandeered wagons and mules throughout the area in order to haul the cotton to the port. When the sailors confiscated the cotton, they were quick to brand it U.S.N. and get it to the port. Porter loaded the cotton aboard his fleet for delivery to the admiralty court in Cairo, Illinois.

Banks felt that the Navy being able to collect cotton and splitting the booty was demoralizing to his men. Banks was also watching his profits sail off with the cotton. We have to remember that Banks held a political appointment. We could speculate that Banks, upon confiscating the cotton, would have had it shipped to manufactures that were politically loyal to him.

This was a crucial point for Banks. His political efforts and obligations were conflicting with his military responsibilities. He was already several days behind schedule. He and Porter could not count on the level of the river holding at its current state. Instead of pilfering around Alexandria, he should have been continuing on his campaign. We will never know if those extra days in Alexandria made any difference in the outcome of the campaign. We do know that if Banks would have proceeded directly, Taylor would not have had the pleasure of Churchill’s Division at the Battle of Pleasant Hill and Banks might have been able to force the Confederates into retreating.

Two days after arriving in Alexandria, on March 26th,

---

70 Winters, 332.


72 Johnson, 101.
General Banks received a dispatch from General Grant, the General-in-Chief of the Union Army, urging him to act in haste on his bid to seize Shreveport. Grant was looking ahead to the campaign against Mobile and to Sherman’s campaign in the East. He told Banks that,

> If you find the taking of Shreveport will occupy ten to fifteen days more than General Sherman gave his troops to be absent from their command, you will send them back at the time he specified, even if it means the abandonment of your expedition.\(^73\)

Besides the race for contraband cotton, what held Banks back was the level of the river. The gunboats were anchored below the falls of Alexandria. The river was so low that Admiral Porter was afraid any heavy boats would be stranded there and fall into Confederate hands. He wrote in his report to the Secretary of the Navy:

> After a great deal of labor and 2½ days hard work we succeeded in getting the Eastport over the rocks on falls hauling her over by main force….One hospital ship [Woodford], belonging to the Marine Brigade, sunk on the falls by striking the rocks, but all the transports went over safely.\(^74\)

The water level forced Porter to leave behind several gunboats and transports. In a letter to Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, Porter wrote, “I shall only be able to take up part of the force I brought with me…I will leave the river guarded all the way through.”\(^75\)

---

\(^{73}\) O.R. 34, pt.2, 610-611.

\(^{74}\) O.R.N. 26, pt.2, 39.

\(^{75}\) Frank Moore., ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events Vol. 8. (New York: Nostrand Publisher, 1865), 520.
Banks left General Grover’s Division to guard Alexandria and the remaining vessels of the fleet. On the 27th, Banks moved out and resumed his march towards Shreveport. With General Banks’ troops moving overland and General Smith’s in transports, convoyed by the gunboats and tinclads, the expedition reached and occupied Grand Ecore, 160 river miles South of Shreveport, without opposition on April 3rd. (See Figure 3) Three days later Banks, Smith and Porter left Grand Ecore planning to meet again at Springfield landing, 110 miles further up the river.\(^76\)

At this point Banks made a crucial error in a long line of errors. He failed to reconnoiter the area and look for an alternate road to Shreveport. The route he chose took him away from the protection of his fleet.\(^77\) Although this route was shorter, Banks traded time for protection. This tradeoff might have been the result of several things: the timetable that Grant had forced by requiring the return of Sherman’s troops, the delay in Alexandria, and the fact that he was already behind schedule.

The ease of Banks’ advance also fooled him. In a letter to his wife, he wrote, “the enemy will not fight a


\(^{77}\) Josephy, 198.
battle this side of Shreveport, if then.”78 When he wrote a similar letter to President Lincoln, the President remarked prophetically to several of his aides, “I am sorry to see this tone of confidence; the next news we shall hear from there, will be defeat.”79

The Confederates continued to pull back and wait for orders and reinforcements. In Shreveport, General Kirby Smith had to keep an eye on both Banks and Steele, trying to evaluate which movement was weaker and which one posed a greater threat to his command. He also cautioned both Taylor and General Sterling Price, in Arkansas, to avoid risking their limited forces in a general engagement.80 Until Smith decided what action should be take, Taylor and Price could only execute rear-guard skirmishes against the advancing Union columns. General Taylor, facing Banks, was appalled at the constant retreating since he was aware of how poor a tactician Banks was. He wrote:

It would have been better to lose the state after a defeat than to surrender it without a fight....King James lost 3 kingdoms for a mass. We may lose three states without a battle.81

78 Holmes, 15.
79 Ibid.
80 Josephy, 199.
81 Ibid.
Reinforcements for Taylor were coming, however. Cavalry units from General Magruder’s Texas district along with German Texas troopers under the command of Colonel August Buchel were riding hard towards Shreveport. They had orders to rendezvous with Generals Churchill and Parsons. An Infantry column from Arkansas, commanded by General Churchill, reached Shreveport with defective ammunition. Once in Shreveport, Smith resupplied them and reorganized them into a Corps of two Divisions, one of Missourians and the other of Arkansans. He then dispatched them to General Taylor’s army. They were ordered to the small town of Keatchie, just north of Mansfield, to await orders from General Kirby Smith before proceeding any further south. Smith did not want to risk having those troops so far from Arkansas in case they could be used there. Smith apparently decided to use them as reserves for the commander who needed them the most, Taylor or Price. Shortly thereafter, Major General Walker’s Texans joined Brigadier General Mouton’s Louisiana troops massing at Taylor’s headquarters near Mansfield, 20 miles south of Shreveport. That brought Taylor’s total troop count to between 8,000 and 9,000 men.

Compounding his error in leaving the cover of his

---

82 Ibid., 16.
fleet, Banks strung out his Army of the Gulf along a primitive road. At times it stretched 20 miles from front to rear. To add to the problem nearly 1,000 wagons were sandwiched between the main elements. General Lee and his mounted cavalry roamed out in advance of the column, but behind them was his 300-wagon supply train. Immediately behind the supply train was General Franklin and his three Divisions of Infantry, followed by a second wagon train of 700, guarded by 1,500 black Louisianans. General Ransom, XIII Corps commander, was concerned that “support could never come up in time should the enemy attack the column head.” Poor marching discipline, the narrow track, and rainy conditions increased the danger to which Banks exposed his army and contributed to his defeat and the failure of his Red River campaign.

CHAPTER 4

THE BATTLES

The Battle of Sabine Crossroads (Mansfield)

On April 7th, three miles north of Pleasant Hill, at Wilson’s farm, the two armies made contact. General Albert Lee’s cavalry encountered four regiments of Tom Green’s Cavalry commanded by Confederate Brigadier General James Major. Major, instead of retreating, ordered his troops to charge the Union Cavalry. In an intense, close range battle with revolvers and carbines, the Confederates rode past the Union troopers and attacked the forward wagons of Lee’s supply train.  

The Union troopers managed to push the Confederates back to Carrol’s Mill before fighting broke off. Lee’s losses for the skirmish numbered only 53, but the aggressiveness of the Confederates alarmed him. He requested that Infantry support be brought to the front in case the Confederates attacked again. Banks ordered Colonel William J. Landram, Commander of the 4th Infantry Division of the XIII Corps, to move one of his Brigades

---

84 Josephy, 200.
forward, past Lee’s supply train, and march ahead of the column to support Lee’s Cavalry and protect it from raiders.\textsuperscript{85}

Taylor took a great risk in making his stand near Mansfield. General Kirby Smith’s advice to Taylor was “not to risk a general engagement until there could be a concentration of forces.”\textsuperscript{86} At the most, Taylor had available 8,000–9,000 men to oppose the advancing Union forces numbering 19,000. Smith felt that Taylor would be too weak to meet the enemy and suggested two courses: “one, to hold the works at Shreveport until he [General Kirby Smith] could concentrate a force to relieve him [Taylor]; the other to retire into Texas and induce the enemy to follow.”\textsuperscript{87}

Taylor, probably remembering Smith’s indecisiveness in his Port Hudson operation, did neither. Early in the morning of April 8\textsuperscript{th}, his troops reached their position in front of Sabine Crossroads and prepared to meet the Union forces head on. He dispersed his command in a L shape pattern along the Mansfield-Pleasant Hill road with Walker’s Division running north-south and Mouton’s Division along with Major’s Division running east-west. \textit{(See Figure}\textsuperscript{88}\textit{.)}}

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 201.

\textsuperscript{86} Parks, 410.

\textsuperscript{87} Taylor, 159.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 201.
5) Walker’s Division consisted of Scurry and Waul with Randall’s Brigade holding the Confederate left side of the road. On Walker’s right were two Regiments of Cavalry commanded by Brigadier General H.P. Bee. On Walker’s left were the two Divisions commanded by General Mouton and Brigadier General James P. Major.

Mouton’s Division consisted of a Louisiana Brigade, commanded by Colonel Henry Gray, and a Texas Brigade commanded by General Polignac. Colonel DeBray’s Cavalry Regiment was positioned a little to the rear on the main road. The complete Confederate force at Mansfield numbered only 8,800 men. Taylor had only 5,300 infantry, 3,000 mounted cavalry and 500 artillery. He was without 4,400 troops from General Churchill’s Division, which was on its way to Mansfield. Had Taylor had the full complement of his force, his victory would have been more decisive.

Banks failed to realize that the road he had chosen to follow would lead him straight into the vanguard of Taylor’s forces. If he had chosen to stay with his fleet, chances are that he would have missed the Confederate army all together and would have captured Shreveport.

---

88 Winters, 341.
89 Taylor, 162.
90 Ibid.
Banks’ main column was quickly approaching Taylor and his entrenched army in Mansfield. His scouts had engaged in minor skirmishes against Taylor’s probing Cavalry since their advance neared Mansfield. It all came to a head on April 8th when, General Albert Lee’s unit advanced on Taylor’s Cavalry, finally pushing them in past a large clearing. They then drove in strength against the Confederate left. A volley of minié balls came in and struck Mouton’s lines killing and wounding several men. The 18th Louisiana, defending their state, fired in volleys, sending the charging Union soldiers back with heavy losses. Colonel Thomas Lucas, Commander of the 1st dismounted Cavalry Brigade, and his unit, were sent forward by Lee as skirmishers to probe the Confederate defenses. They advanced until a volley from Confederate forces forced them to withdraw. After meeting with stiffer resistance than expected, Lee sent in two other Infantry Regiments, while his Cavalry covered the flanks.91 At around 1 PM, Lee had driven his forces to a large clearing, opposite of Taylor’s force.

---

91 Winters, 341.
Figure 5. The Confederate Assault at The Battle of Sabine Pass.

Facing Taylor, on the other side of Honeycutt Hill, were between 4,800 and 5,700 Union troops. They were positioned on the opposite side of the field with General Lee’s Brigade across from Generals Scurry and Buchel’s Texas Cavalry unit, which had \( \frac{1}{2} \) of an artillery battery, commanded by Captain Haldeman, on its flank. On the right side of the road, was the other \( \frac{1}{2} \) of the artillery battery, commanded by Captain Daniel, with Colonel Landrams 4\textsuperscript{th} Division of the XIII Corps. On the extreme right, across

---


93 Each source had different numbers, with 4,800 being the lowest and 5,700 being the highest.
from Major’s Division, was Colonel Tom Lucas’ Cavalry Brigade. General Taylor had been waiting for orders from General Kirby Smith, in Shreveport, on how to proceed. With his knowledge of Banks’ incompetence, the day growing shorter, and suspecting that Banks was waiting for the arrival of more men, at 4 PM Taylor gave the order to charge.

General Mouton’s Division, especially the 18th Louisiana, charged the union lines with little restraint, giving the traditional “Rebel Yell.” They rushed through the field under heavy fire from the Union troops and artillery. At first they were driven back by minié balls and canister, but they were rallied by their officer corps and started forward again. Crossing the field they suffered great losses in the same officer corps that had rallied them only moments before. Including the Division Commander, General Mouton, Cols. Beard, and Armant, were lost in the assault. (See Figure 6) With Mouton’s death, General Polignac assumed command and rallied the Confederate soldiers to avenge the death of their beloved commander, General Mouton, and drive the Union soldiers from the battlefield.

---

94 Holmes, 17.
The Union lines were situated on a rise above the Confederate advance where the troops could fire down on their attackers. On their third attempt the Confederates managed to scale the hill and drive back the Union lines. Within the first half-hour of fighting, the Confederates lost 750 men, one-third of the Division’s strength.\textsuperscript{95} Seven soldiers carrying the standard of the Crescent Regiment were shot in succession.\textsuperscript{96} As the Confederates advanced up the rise to the Union position, the Union lines failed to hold, with the 130\textsuperscript{th} Illinois being overrun and crushed by the Confederate left line.

Taylor, sitting on his horse, chewing on his cigar and looking at the crumbling Union lines, ordered Walker to move forward with Waul and Scurry’s Brigades and turn the enemy flank.\textsuperscript{97} Walker’s Infantry and Bee’s Cavalry charged up the hill with their bayonets fixed and assaulted the Union left, driving them back. Bee was ordered to move around the Union left and flank Dudley to gain control of Landram’s rear. Taylor then ordered Scurry to drive through the Union left center and gain possession of the road behind Landram. Scurry’s Texans stormed up the hill

\textsuperscript{95} Josephy, 205.


\textsuperscript{97} O.R. 34, pt.1, 564; Johnson., 139.
with fixed bayonets, swept through the 3rd Massachusetts Cavalry, causing the 23rd Wisconsin and the 67th Indiana to fall back. Scurry’s men then captured three pieces of artillery and turned them on the retreating Union soldiers.  

Figure 6. Mouton’s Assault on the Union Right.  

After being decimated by the Confederate forces opposing them, the first Union line, mostly mounted Cavalry forces and one Division of the XII Corps, began to withdraw.

---

98 Johnson, 139.

99 Bergeron, 14.
in full flight, leaving prisoners, wagons, and guns in Confederate hands. General Ransom, hearing of Walker's advance, had ordered the 83rd Ohio to move its position from the extreme right to the extreme left. This was a mistake. The withdrawal of the 83rd allowed the right side of the line to be outflanked and by the time they managed to get into position the Union left line had dissolved and was in full retreat.\(^{100}\) In the resulting confusion, the two Union regiments on that side, the 48th Ohio and the 130th Illinois, were surrounded and annihilated by the onslaught of Confederate shot and ball. General Ransom himself, along with both of his Brigade commanders on the field, were wounded. His two Vice-Commanders, Emerson and Vance, were also captured. At this point the entire Union line began to crumble and fall back in complete disarray.\(^{101}\)

The determination of the Confederate charge intimidated the Union soldiers as much as the rounds that were being fired at them. The entire Union line was in complete disorder and they continued to fall back, on top of advancing Union reinforcements. Sensing the possibility of a rout, Generals Franklin and Cameron arrived on the field with reinforcements. Cameron's 1,300 troops of the

\(^{100}\) Ibid., 136; O.R. 34. pt. 1, 266-267; Josephy, 204.

3rd Division of the XIII Corps established a defensive line to the rear of where Landram’s troops had been fighting in a desperate attempt to hold off the Confederate charge. Cameron advanced his Division into the clearing and started the Union counterattack. This new line managed to hold the Confederates in check for almost an hour.\textsuperscript{102} The Confederates managed to press the Union lines and outflank it on both ends. This double envelopment caused Cameron’s lines to collapse sending the Union soldiers retreating further south. Their own line of retreat, the Mansfield Road, was heavily congested with wagons, mules, and retreating soldiers. Because of this, the retreat was hampered and many Union troops were taken as prisoners.\textsuperscript{103}

General Franklin, not being fooled by the minor success of holding the Confederate assault in check, sent word to Brigadier General William Emory ordering him to, "March forward at once with the 1st Division of the XIX Corps, and form a line at the first position he [Emory] could find."\textsuperscript{104} But Franklin and his lines were unable to hold the Confederate advance in check and the Union troops gave way in panic and retreated further south.

General Emory was on the march towards the battlefield

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} O.R. 34. pt. 1, 257, 273-274.
when he came upon soldiers falling back from the battle in total panic. He advanced his men to within two miles of the battlefield, formed them into a defensive position, and waited for the Confederates to come into view. His 1st Division of the XIX Corps formed a defensive line on the high ground overlooking the Confederate approach. The Confederates, still flushed with victory, advanced on Emory’s skirmishers and charged his main line. The assault was ineffective against a defensive position as strong as Emory’s, and they were repulsed with little loss of life. With the day getting late and the Confederates too tired and disorganized to accomplish anything positive, they withdrew from Emory’s position. They did, however, attempt to out-flank the Union lines, but failed. By nightfall, the Union forces, disorganized and demoralized, continued their retreat south. The Battle of Mansfield was over.

Taylor had won a decisive victory and destroyed Banks’ entire campaign, along with his political future. The Union losses numbered 115 men killed, 648 wounded and 1,423 captured. The Confederates also managed to capture twenty pieces of artillery, 200 wagons, and 1,000 mules. Taylor’s losses only numbered 1,000 men, mostly in Mouton’s Division.105 Taylor had won more than a battle. General

105 Taylor, 347.
Steele learned of Banks’ defeat and started his withdraw back to Little Rock, ending the Northern pincer movement of the plan.

After the battle, General Taylor had a clear understanding of his current situation. He knew the Federal invasion force was divided into two main columns. The one that contained the bulk of the Infantry and Cavalry troops, along with their supplies was extended along the road between Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. The other column, approaching from the south along the Red River, was Porter’s fleet and the detachment of the XVII Corps under General Kilby Smith. Taylor felt his most important task was to prevent the joining of these two columns. The nearest point that would allow Banks to open communication with his river column was at Pleasant Hill. From there a road led to Blair’s landing. Because of this, Taylor dispatched part of his cavalry to occupy this road.\(^{106}\)

This was a battle of impatience. As I stated before Banks’ impatience caused him to follow the wrong road north and abandon the cover of his fleet. Taylor’s impatience allowed him to order an attack on the opposing forces before all of his troops were in place on the battlefield. Had he allowed time for his entire force to reach the

\(^{106}\) Ibid., 164-65; O.R. 34, pt.1, 565-66.
battlefield and take up positions, his victory could have been more complete. He would have had fresh soldiers to face Emory’s Division. On the other hand, Taylor had good reason for seizing the opportunity to attack when he did. Banks’ army was strung out along the road in a vulnerable position.

The Battle of Pleasant Hill

The village of Pleasant Hill was situated on a plateau of open ground. The buildings included a hotel, college, a church, stores, and a number of houses. Several roads converged at Pleasant Hill. The Mansfield Road entered from the northwest, the Sabine Road from the west. Leading into town from the east was the road to Blair’s Landing on the Red River. To the southeast was the road leading to Grand Ecore and Natchitoches, and to the south lay the Fort Jesup Road.107

General A.J. Smith and his XVI Corps reached Pleasant Hill on Friday night, April 8th. Smith and his troops had been ordered by Banks to be ready to march to Shreveport, from Loggy Bayou, by the 7th. That day, the 7th, Smith left Porter’s fleet with two Divisions of his XVI Corps, with orders to rendezvous with Banks. Due to poor roads and

weather, Smith’s progress was slow. On the 8th Smith heard the cannon fire from the Battle of Mansfield and began to double-time his march. Upon learning the extent of the Confederate assault, he ordered his men to, “bivouac on their weapons.”108 Anticipating an attack, Smith prepared for battle and dispatched pickets to his flanks and rear. That night, the remaining demoralized parties of the Cavalry and the XIII Corps arrived in Pleasant Hill.109

Banks allowed his men a brief rest following their long retreat. After a hot meal the men stretched out in a line of battle and fell asleep. Early on the 9th, General A.J. Smith, with his XVI Corps, formed a line of defense just south at Pleasant Hill. Colonel Shaw, with his Brigade from Mower’s Division, was placed in the center, crossing the road. General Dwight’s Brigade of the XIX Corps, held its position on the extreme right along a wooded ravine. Smith placed General McMillian’s Brigade to the rear of Dwight to act as reserves. Emory’s 3rd Brigade, commanded by Colonel Benedict, was positioned to the extreme left and to the rear of Shaw. They had taken a defensive position by a dry ditch in a slight depression. His forward troops had light cover, but his left was

109 Crump, 123.
vulnerable and exposed. His men passed the time by cooking, sleeping, and finding water.\textsuperscript{110}

About 400 yards to Benedict’s rear were Smith’s Divisions of the XVI Corps under the command of Mower, along with two artillery batteries. Smith stationed one regiment on the Union left along a tree line, to guard against a Confederate flanking movement. His men were positioned to cover the roads leading to Blair’s Landing, Natchitoches, and Fort Jesup.\textsuperscript{111} Banks, in order to avoid the debacle of the previous day, ordered all the wagons and wounded to be sent to the rear.\textsuperscript{112} This included all medical wagons.

At 11:00 AM, Banks, from his headquarters in the Childers House on the ridge behind the lines, decided that there would be no battle that day. The afternoon was progressing and the Confederates showed no signs of attacking. He wrote to Admiral Porter that the army intended to resume their advance on Shreveport that evening.\textsuperscript{113}

Taylor, on the other hand, had something else in mind. He soon had his forces preparing for another attack.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 125.
\textsuperscript{111} O.R. 34, pt.1, 346.
\textsuperscript{112} Taylor, 349.
\textsuperscript{113} Joint Committee on the Conduct of War, 176, 218.
Taylor granted his men some well deserved rest after their victory. At the same time, Churchill’s Division of two Brigades arrived that evening from Keatchie, twenty-two miles away. Taylor expected that the Union forces would retreat during the night, but if not he planned to attack at dawn with Churchill’s troops commanded by Parsons and Tappen. It was imperative that the Confederates drive the Union troops beyond Pleasant Hill. Banks had expected to reach Shreveport on the 11th with the XIII and the XIX Corps and the Cavalry by way of Pleasant Hill and Mansfield and by the 8th had covered 2/3 of the distance between the two points. If Taylor and his Confederate forces could push Banks beyond Pleasant Hill, he would not be able to unite with Admiral Porter before Grand Ecore, thirty-six miles away. He would be forced to abandon the campaign entirely.

The next day, before dawn, Taylor advanced his forces towards Pleasant Hill. His Cavalry captured numerous Union stragglers before arriving near Pleasant Hill about 9 AM. The Confederate General, H.P. Bee, was the first of the Confederate commanders to arrive on the field. He had with him only two Regiments, Colonel Buchels’ and Colonel Hardeman’s. He dispatched them to ascertain the extent of

---

114 O.R. 34, pt.1, 565-566; Crump, 125.
the Union lines. They soon returned reporting that the Union lines extended over a mile to the right. \footnote{Solon Benson, “The Civil War Battle of Pleasant Hill, Louisiana”, \textit{Annals of Iowa} 6 (1906): 22.} Bee was surprised at what he called an “extraordinary show of force.” \footnote{O.R. 34, pt.1, 607-608.} He decided not attack with his two Regiments. General Green arrived on the field shortly thereafter, and assumed command. After reconnoitering the enemy’s line, he also concluded not to attack, and opted to wait for the Infantry. \footnote{Ibid.}

General Churchill and his command, along with the remainder of Parson’s, Walker’s, and Polignac’s commands, arrived on the field at 2 PM. Once there, Taylor allowed his men to rest for a few hours, while he formulated his strategy for the day.

About 3 PM, Taylor began deploying his troops on the battlefield. The battlefield was a mile wide from east to west and two miles long from north to south. General Churchill’s Division of two Brigades, commanded by Generals Parsons and Tappen, were advancing on the Union left. Walker’s Division was placed in the center with Randall, Waul and Scurry commanding their Brigades. On the Confederate left were the cavalry Brigades under Generals...
Bee and Major. General Polignac was kept in reserve, positioned in the rear, along the main road, in case the Union forces broke through and started advancing north.

Taylor had given Churchill the task of moving his Division around the Union left line and outflanking Benedict. At 4:30 PM, Major Brent started firing artillery volleys from 800 yards into the Union lines to mask Churchill’s advance. Soon after that Churchill’s attack began. Churchill’s assault drove in the outposts and a Brigade of the XIX Corps. Walker advanced his Division while Brent advanced his guns and pressed Shaw’s entire first line. Major managed to turn Dwight and the Union right on his first advance and gained possession of Blair’s Road thereby forcing Dwight to fall back and reform his Brigade.

Just before 5 PM, Churchill had driven in the skirmishers and hit Benedict’s Brigade, crushing the Union left flank. (See Figure 7) The swiftness of the advance, along with the Confederate fury, demoralized Benedict’s men. Benedict was killed in the first assault. Without a leader, his lines began to crumble under the Confederate charge. Churchill’s men rushed over the field not

---

118 Taylor, 167.
119 O.R. 34, pt.1, 308.
120 Taylor, 167.
realizing that General Smith’s lines were on their immediate right. The collapse of Benedict on the Union left, exposed the whole Union line.

Figure 7. The 1\textsuperscript{st} Phase at the Battle of Pleasant Hill.\textsuperscript{121}

Hearing the advance of Churchill, General Walker advanced his two lines against Shaw’s entire front. Shaw allowed them to advance to within 80 yards before opening fire with canister and shot.\textsuperscript{122} Despite its heavy losses, Walker’s entire second line advanced over their wounded and dead, through the heavy smoke, and pressed Shaw’s front.

\textsuperscript{121} Henry Woodhead, ed., Illustrated Atlas of the Civil War, vol. 3 of The Illustrated History of the Civil War (Virginia: Time Life), 312.

\textsuperscript{122} O.R. 34, pt.1, 309; Winters, 357.
At that moment, Major’s dismounted cavalry charged against Shaw’s right forcing it to fall back. General Smith, fearing that Shaw’s Brigade might be enveloped, directed him to fall back and connect with his right. Walker managed to outflank Shaw’s Brigade and captured most of the 32nd Iowa.

During the exchange Dwight shifted the 1st Brigade of the XIX Corps further to the rear leaving Shaw’s right uncovered and open for a flanking movement. Bee, sensing a Union weakness, moved his command to the Confederate left and pressed hard against Dwight and the Union right. Polignac, who had been observing the engagement from the rear, saw an opening and joined Bee in advancing on Dwight’s right and right center. Major positioned his Brigade around the far right flank of Dwight and pushed them into their breastworks. Dwight was now fighting from a pure defensive posture and was in danger of being surrounded and cut off from his command.

While the Confederate left was turning the Union right, Churchill’s advance took him right across Smith’s front. This crucial error on Churchill’s part exposed the

---

123 Johnson, 198.
124 O.R. 34, pt.1, 309.
125 Ibid.
entire Confederate right flank. Seizing the opportunity, Smith ordered a charge by his whole line, crushing Churchill’s right and rolling it into Walker’s advance, throwing his assault into confusion. This allowed Smith to drive in the Confederate right and rout their attempt to flank the Union Army.\(^{126}\) (See Figure 8)

The Confederate right was completely crushed and forced back beyond their 5 PM start line.\(^{128}\) Severe fighting continued on the left where Polignac, Randall, Waul and Scurry were continuing their advance but were hampered by

\(^{126}\) Ibid.; Winters, 352.

\(^{127}\) Woodhead, 312.

\(^{128}\) Martin, 16-17.
failing light. With darkness falling the Union forces again pulled back from their defensive position and retreated further south towards Grande Ecore. Banks had a victory, thanks to General A.J. Smith’s tactics and battlefield patience. As he addressed Smith after the battle he said, “God bless you, General; you saved the army.”

The Battle of Pleasant Hill had been one of the most evenly contested of the war. Both sides had around 11,000 men on the battlefield. Taylor lost 1,700 men and three guns, while Banks lost 1,400 men. In spite of his victory, Banks decided to withdraw from his position and return to the Red River to get supplies from Porter’s fleet.

---

129 Ibid., 17.
130 Ibid.
CHAPTER 5

THE RETREAT

On the night of the 9th, Banks conferred with Generals Franklin, Emory, and Dwight on what to do about their current situation. Dwight advised retreating to Grand Ecore while Franklin and Emory advised marching to Blair’s Landing, where Porter’s Naval Flotilla would be waiting and would be able to give them added protection. None of them advised continuing the campaign to Shreveport. Banks decided that Dwight’s plan was safer since he had no assurance that they would be able to cross Bayou Pierre.

General Smith did not attend the council meeting and it was not until midnight that he learned of the retreat. He protested Banks’ decision and was concerned about his dead and wounded.

The dead of my command were not buried, and that I had not the means of transporting my wounded...Many had not been gathered from the field. Smith requested to stay until noon, but Banks refused, infuriating Smith. Smith then took his request to General

---

131 Johnson, 163.
132 O.R. 34, pt.1, 309.
Franklin and proposed that Banks should be relieved of his command and Franklin himself should takeover. Franklin reminded Smith that he was talking about mutiny and both of them could be charged.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{The Naval Troubles}

As Banks was making his way into North Louisiana, Porter and his flotilla were sailing up the Red River to Loggy Bayou. Because of the shallow depth of the river, Porter was forced to leave several of his ships at Alexandria. At Grand Ecore, he again had to pare down his fleet, leaving some of the heavier vessels and taking only his lighter transports and gunships. It was becoming increasingly difficult for Porter and his commanders to control the navigation of the fleet. The water level was reaching such a dangerous level that Porter’s Mississippi Squadron was in danger.

While Banks’ campaign and political future was being destroyed, Admiral Porter and the flotilla were making their way to Springfield Landing. On April 8\textsuperscript{th} and 9\textsuperscript{th}, Porter heard several rumors of a battle to his west, but he had no confirmation and assumed the enemy had been defeated and forced to retreat.\textsuperscript{134} On the 9\textsuperscript{th}, Porter reached Nine

\textsuperscript{133} Winters, 357.  
\textsuperscript{134} O.R.N., 36, 60; Joiner and Vetter, 54.
Mile bend. The following day his fleet pulled into the mouth of Loggy Bayou.\textsuperscript{135} (See Figure 3.)

![Figure 9. Banks' Route in and out of North Louisiana.\textsuperscript{136}](image)

Upon his arrival, Porter discovered that Confederate forces had placed a steamer, \textit{New Falls City}, across the breadth of the river, with her bow and stern resting fifteen feet on the opposite banks and the mid-ship hull lying on the bottom. Porter wrote to Sherman saying:

...[it] made me laugh. It was the smartest thing I ever knew the rebels to do....An invitation in large letters to attend a ball in Shreveport was kindly left stuck up by the rebels.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{135} O.R.N., 34, 380.

\textsuperscript{136} Martin, 14.

\textsuperscript{137} O.R.N., 36, 60; Joiner and Vetter, 54.
Shortly before Porter could remove the *New Falls City*, Captain William Andres, escorted by 50 men from the 14<sup>th</sup> New York Cavalry, rode in from the west carrying dispatches from Banks. Andres also carried orders for Gen. Kilby Smith, instructing him, along with Porter’s fleet, to return to Grand Ecore at once because Banks was in full retreat.<sup>138</sup> Porter knew with Banks retreating south his fleet was in peril and that it was only a matter of time before a Confederate force detected its presence and attacked. Porter and Smith started their retreat south before the Confederates could blockade them in.

Porter found his retreat just as difficult as his advance. The low water level caused many of his transports to run aground, causing gunshipped rudders and broken wheels.<sup>139</sup> On April 12<sup>th</sup>, Porter reached Blair’s Landing, 45 miles North of Grand Ecore. Several more of his transports and gunboats ran aground, causing more delay.

Shortly after arriving at Blair’s Landing, Porter’s fears became reality when a Confederate Cavalry force of 1200, commanded by General Tom Green, arrived and intercepted Porter and his fleet. Gen. Kilby Smith

---

<sup>138</sup> Joiner and Vetter, 51-55.

<sup>139</sup> O.R.N., 36, 357.
gathered guns from three of his transports, landed on the opposite shore, and opened fire on Green and his troops. Green’s sharpshooters, deployed along the bank and sheltered by cottonwoods, began to pour a steady fire into both Smith’s troops and the boats.¹⁴⁰ Smith posted his men along the hurricane decks behind bales of cotton, hay, and bags of oats, trying to minimize his casualties. Green, on horseback, led the charge against the flotilla. The battle continued for about two hours, with Green’s troops delivering what, then-Commander Thomas O. Selfridge¹⁴¹ called the “heaviest and most concentrated fire of musketry that I have ever witnessed.”¹⁴²

The Lexington managed to silence Green’s artillery with her 8-inch guns, but not before the Confederate artillery had inflicted severe damage to one of Porter’s ships. During the initial Confederate volley, the Osage had broken away and drifted to the riverbank where the Confederates had massed and were firing. Selfridge used the Osage as a shield to bring his guns to bear on the Confederates, and from a distance of 20 yards, fired a round of canister into the Confederate lines.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 359.

¹⁴¹ Thomas O Selfridge held the rank of Commander in the Union Navy and was the commander of the Lexington.


¹⁴³ Joiner and Vetter, 58.
volley decapitated Green, leaving the Confederate command structure itself headless. The loss demoralized Green’s troops and left them without a commander. Around 6 PM, with darkness upon them and their leader dead, the Confederate troops withdrew to form up with Taylor’s army. Losses on both sides were light.\textsuperscript{144}

By April 15\textsuperscript{th}, the entire fleet was safely docked at Grand Ecore. Porter’s ships showed the scars of their journey. The sides of some transports were half shot away, and their smokestacks looked like huge pepperboxes. The Confederate forces even managed to sink Porter’s largest gunship, the \textit{Eastport}. Banks and his army had arrived just before the fleet.

Upon his arrival, Porter went to Banks’ personal tent where he found him reading from a copy of \textit{Scott’s Tactics}. Banks told Porter he had won the Battles of Sabine Crossroad (Mansfield) and Pleasant Hill, routed the Confederate Army and was withdrawing because lack of water.\textsuperscript{145} Porter, confused, reminded Banks that he had only been six miles from a river of water and could have easily continued on his advance since the Confederate Army was

\textsuperscript{144} O.R.N. 26, pt.2, 46, 55; O.R. 34, 172-204, 571, 633.; Joiner and Vetter, 58.

\textsuperscript{145} Joiner and Vetter, 58.
destroyed. Completely disgusted with Banks, Porter told him he should have read *Scott’s Tactics* before he went to Sabine Crossroads. They agreed to stay at Grand Ecore a few days before continuing their retreat South to Alexandria.

At Grand Ecore, Banks decided to take a defensive position and ordered his men to construct fortifications and entrenchments. In spite of the fact that reinforcements were received to offset his losses at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, he did not want to go into battle without much heavier reinforcements, preferably Steele’s men from Arkansas. He was afraid to move outside of his entrenchments because of Taylor’s troops on the perimeter.¹⁴⁷

Banks received a dispatch on the 15th from Sherman reminding him it was almost time to return the 10,000 men that were on loan from him. The release of Sherman’s troops, Banks decided, would endanger the Army and the Navy, which then needed protection while maneuvering in the waters of the now receding river.

For the six days that the Union force remained at Grand Ecore they were very busy. Porter’s men were busy

---

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.
¹⁴⁷ Martin, 18.
trying to raise the *Eastport* while Banks was reorganizing his staff. His first act was to fire Brigadier General Charles P. Stone, his chief of staff. Stone had become Banks’ scapegoat for the debacle at Mansfield. His replacement was General Dwight, a Brigade commander in Emory’s Division of the XIX Corps. At the same time, Banks relieved two of his Cavalry officers, General Lee, commander of Franklin’s Cavalry Division, and Colonel Dudley, a Brigade commander.\(^{148}\)

By the 18\(^{th}\), changing conditions forced Banks to abandon his quest for Shreveport all together. Grant had sent clear orders to return Sherman’s men, and Porter’s fleet had to make its way downstream before the river level became too low to navigate. Preparations for the withdrawal began on the 19\(^{th}\), and the Army was on its way by the 21\(^{st}\).\(^{149}\) The retreat was not an easy affair. Banks’ men were short on food and especially water, and took to burning almost every building in their path. Most of the fires were attributed to General Smith’s men, who would later accompany Sherman on his Atlanta Campaign.

---

\(^{148}\) Ibid.

\(^{149}\) Ibid.
Banks’ retreat south came to an obstacle on the 23rd, when he reached Monett’s Ferry. Here Bee’s Cavalry Brigade of 1,600 men, along with four Batteries of Artillery, had taken up a position along the main road from Grand Ecore to Alexandria, where it crossed the Cane River. Banks at first was unable to cross the river and was worried about being trapped because of heavy pressure on his rear. Banks was saved when Brigadier General Henry Birge located a ford a couple of miles upstream and crossed it with a large Union detachment. Moving through rough terrain, Birge immediately began a flanking movement around Bee’s line. Although Birge’s first attack was repulsed, Bee decided that the day was lost and retreated from the battlefield.\footnote{O.R. 34, pt.1, 604-608, 262-264.}

As soon as Bee withdrew, the relieved Union forces constructed a bridge and crossed the river. Taylor, learning of Bee’s retreat, was infuriated. He personally blamed Bee for allowing Banks to escape and later relieved him of his command.\footnote{Taylor, 182.}

While Banks was making his way south, Porter stayed behind and tried to raise the sunken Eastport, the largest of his gunboats. Three gunboats and two transports remained with Porter while the rest of the fleet was
dispatched down river. On the 21st the Eastport was raised and began being towed south. On its voyage the Eastport ran aground nine different times and at last became too difficult for Porter and his ships. On the 26th, the ship had made it 60 miles north of Alexandria before running aground again. Porter gave up and ordered her set afire, to keep her from falling into enemy hands.\textsuperscript{152}

The Union loss of the Eastport was just the start of Porter’s misadventure on the way to Alexandria. Taylor had established several batteries near the confluence of the Cane and Red Rivers, and forced Porter’s ships to run a gauntlet of fire. Porter’s two escort transport ships were sunk, one with the loss of 200 black crewman. The three other gunboats were badly shot up. Porter’s desperate attempt to save the Eastport was a failure and cost his Mississippi Squadron additional ships and personnel.\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{Bailey’s Dam}

On the 25th Porter found himself back in Alexandria. Here he encountered a new problem. He found the continued fall of the Red River had lowered the water level to the point that the rapids above the town were no longer

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{152} David D. Porter, \textit{A Naval History of the Civil War} (New Jersey: Castle Publishing), 520.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 521-524.
\end{footnotesize}
navigable. At places the water at Alexandria was only three feet deep. Porter’s gunboats needed at least seven feet to pass the falls. Porter was faced with losing ten gunboats, the bulk of his Mississippi Squadron.\textsuperscript{154}

Banks’ choices were limited. Unless Porter could cross the rapids, his only viable alternative was to remain and defend Alexandria in order to protect the fleet from capture or destruction. Gen. Franklin sent Banks 38 year old Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Bailey, from the 4\textsuperscript{th} Wisconsin, with a plan for moving the fleet over the falls. Bailey before the war had been a lumberman in Wisconsin. He remembered seeing logs being floated down river on artificial freshets made by damming streams with wing dams. Bailey proposed building a series of winged dams in the river in order to raise the water level. His plan would allow the fleet to pass through the rapids and continue their retreat.

Bailey suggested to Porter that five dams be built above the falls. The shortest pair would be upstream and would have the widest opening for the water and the ships. The largest would be placed at the spot of the rapids where greater water depth was needed. It would have the smallest opening and act like a funnel to push the ships over the

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 524.
Bailey started work on his dams during the 1st week in May. At times 3,000 men worked 24-hour shifts to complete them. Along with the 3,000 troops, Banks gave Bailey 300 wagons, 56 mule teams, and at least 100 oxen. Banks informed Bailey that the ships would have to pass within ten days because he had orders from Grant to move the Army out of Alexandria within that time.

Banks was feeling the pressure of being on a campaign in an unfriendly region. He was cut off from his supply lines on the Mississippi by Confederate forces. He told Porter that his horses and cattle were running out of forage and it was imperative that they continue their way south.

Construction on the largest dam, the lower one, began on May 1st. Many of the men Banks detailed to Bailey were former woodsman. Several New York Regiments, the 116th and 161st, and one Regiment from Maine, the 13th Maine, aided in the construction. The men of the 13th Maine were set to

156 O.R. 34, pt.1, 585-586.
159 O.R.N. 26, pt.2, 140.
160 *Ibid.*, 130; Winters, 369; Ingram, 140.
work on building the wing of the dam that came from the Pineville side of the river. They cut down trees, hauled them to the river, and floated them down stream to the falls area. The trees were then placed 15-20 abreast pointed towards the Alexandria bank. They were crosstied with timbers and filled with sand, bricks, rocks, and brush.\textsuperscript{161}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{dam_location.png}
\caption{The Location of Lt. Col. Bailey's Dams.\textsuperscript{162}}
\end{figure}

Across the river, on the Alexandria side, Banks ordered two colored Regiments, commanded by Colonel George Robinson, to start construction of the crib dam. They were to extend it to four coal barges which were placed about 150 feet from the Alexandria banks. They were assisted by 400 troops from another colored Infantry Brigade. Men were ordered to tear down nearby cotton gins,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{161} Winters, 369; Ingram, 140
\end{itemize}
sugar mills, and houses for brick and lumber.\textsuperscript{163} Lumber from saw mills and warehouses was also confiscated by Banks' men. The cribs were crates made of heavy wood beams. Navy blacksmiths made bolts to bind the cribs together. After naval ships pushed the cribs into place, they were filled with rocks taken from the riverbed, bricks from local buildings, and heavy machinery. They also stripped armor off some of the flotilla and placed it in the cribs.\textsuperscript{164}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure11.png}
\caption{Bailey's Dams.\textsuperscript{165}}
\end{figure}

By mid-afternoon on May 8\textsuperscript{th}, the dams were nearly

\textsuperscript{163} Joiner and Vetter, 65.
\textsuperscript{164} Ingram, 149.
\textsuperscript{165} Johnson and Buel, 359.
finished. The water had risen enough to allow the Lexington, Fort Hindman, Neosho, and Osage to enter the waters provided by the dam and navigate the rapids below Alexandria. Banks’ and Porter’s excitement soon became disappointment when, on the 9th, the water pressure had become so great that two of Porter’s coal barges broke loose and drifted towards the dams, damaging several.

Bailey managed to mend the damaged dams and finish the remaining dams on the 11th. That day, with the help of several tugboats, the Mound City, Carondolet, and the Pittsburg managed to get over the upper falls. On the 12th, the Ozark, Louisville, and Chillicothe made their way across the falls. By ten that morning the remaining vessels of Porter’s Mississippi Squadron passed the dams and made it below the falls without a single accident. By 3 PM that afternoon all of Porter’s ships were coaled, had their ammunition replaced, and were steaming down river. Bailey had saved Porter’s fleet.

*Mansura and Yellow Bayou*

While Porter was getting his fleet past Alexandria, Banks’ army was inflicting additional damage on the

---

167 Porter, 527-533.
168 Ibid.; Ingram, 151.
city. On the 13th, the army pulled out and proceeded on its march south towards Simmesport, along the south bank of the Red, covering the fleet as far as Fort DeRussy.

Three days outside of Alexandria, on the morning of May 16th, Banks found Taylor’s small army had formed a defensive line across his own path for retreat near Mansura. After a four-hour artillery duel, Taylor withdrew from the battlefield. On the 17th, Banks arrived in Simmesport.

On the 18th, a rear guard action was fought at Yellow Bayou by a portion of Banks’ army, commanded by General Mower, and the Confederate commander, General Wharton. The battle of Yellow Bayou was the last engagement of the Red River Campaign. General Mower had been ordered by General A.J. Smith to cover the Union retreat and clear out rebels on their flank. Mower took Colonel Sylvester Hill’s Brigade, which was formed by two Companies, the 33rd Missouri and the 35th Iowa, to set up a defensive position on the southern end of the Simmesport Road. Smith also ordered the Brigades of Colonel William Lynch and Colonel William Shaw to aid Mower in his delay action.169 Mower had also brought several pieces of artillery, including a

---

169 Bailey, 225.
rifled gun from the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Indiana Battery, and four smoothbore guns from the 9\textsuperscript{th} Indiana Battery.\textsuperscript{170}

General Taylor commanded the Confederate forces that were advancing on the Union rear. At daylight, on the morning of the 18\textsuperscript{th}, minor skirmishes began. The Confederate line was comprised of Parsons’ Brigade,

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 226.
commanded by Steele, on the Confederate right. He was supported on his left, the Confederate Center, by Bee’s Division of Debray and Bagby’s Brigades. On the Confederate left was Major’s Division of Hardeman’s and Baylor’s Brigades.\footnote{Ibid.} By 11 AM they would be joined by Stone’s Brigade of Polignac’s Division.\footnote{Ibid., 225-227.}

The two armies were facing each other through a large open field, with woods to their backs. The woods extended to Yellow Bayou and its thick underbrush. After a half-hour artillery duel, the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} Texas Regiments were ordered to charge the Union left and feel-out their defenses. The 12\textsuperscript{th} Texas Cavalry was dismounted and ordered to support the movement by attacking the Union right.\footnote{Ibid., 227.} After another cannonade, General Wharton ordered the full line of dismounted Cavalry to charge the Union position. On the Federal line, Mower dispatched his reserves, Shaw’s Brigade, and ordered the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Indiana Artillery “double shotted with canister.”\footnote{Ibid.} As the dismounted Cavalry charged, the Federals reinforced their right line and fired several volleys into the charging Confederate troops. The
12th Texas advanced into a hail of heavy fire of grapeshot and minié balls that decimated their ranks and left them disorganized and disoriented.\textsuperscript{176}

As the Confederate left line fell back, the 21st Texas and a Battalion commanded by Colonel DeWitt Giddings advanced on the Union left. At this time Polignac's

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 229.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 228.
Brigades advanced on the Union right and right center. The 15th and 34th Texas advanced to within ten feet of the 24th Missouri when the Union troops surprised them with a hail of musket fire. The 24th, using the element of surprise, jumped up in four lines and demanded the Confederates surrender. The 15th and 34th immediately began firing and managed to escape back to the Confederate defenses.\textsuperscript{178}

During the final stage of the battle, the musket and cannon fire ignited the woods and the underbrush and started a fire that enveloped the battlefield in heavy clouds of smoke.\textsuperscript{179} General A.J. Smith later reported that "The fire during this stage of the battle set the thicket on fire, so that it formed a barrier impassible for either party."\textsuperscript{180} The Battle of Yellow Bayou lasted for four hours, at which time Taylor withdrew his forces from the field.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 231.

\textsuperscript{179} Josephy, 222.

\textsuperscript{180} O.R. 34, pt.1, 304-312.
Losses for the Confederates were heavy compared to the Union losses. Taylor claimed 452 killed and wounded and 156 captured as prisoners. The Union reported 38 killed, 226 wounded, and three missing. The 5th Texas Cavalry, which was once commanded by Tom Greene, emerged from this battle with only seven men left. Parson’s Brigade reported 12 killed, 67 wounded, and two missing. Of that number, the 12th Texas had 10 killed, 61 wounded, and two missing.\[182\]

\[181\] Ibid., 231.
While the battle was underway Lt. Col. Bailey was rescuing the fleet once again. He had several of his troops constructed a bridge of steamboats across the Atchafalaya River, in order for the Union troops to cross. The Union army repulsed Taylor’s assault, and on May 19th–20th, Banks marched his army towards the Mississippi River. With Banks’ army and Porter’s fleet safely in the Mississippi River, the campaign came to an end.

---

182 Ibid., 311; Bailey, 233; Josephy, 222; Taylor, 191.
183 Taylor, 193; Joiner and Vetter, 66.
CHAPTER 6

THE END RESULT

With Banks and Porter safely across the Atchafalaya River, in Union Territory, the Red River Campaign came to an end. Statistically, and in terms of Union objectives, this was a complete Confederate victory. The Confederate Army, under Taylor, managed to meet the Union advance head on and drive Banks back into South Louisiana. Shreveport remained “Union Free” until the end of the war and East Texas was not occupied by Federal Troops. The only aspect that could be considered a Union victory would be the fact that Porter was able to confiscate as much cotton as he did.

Except for materials, the losses on both sides were minor compared to campaigns in the Eastern Theater and to those few conducted within the Western Theater. At the Battle of Shiloh Confederate losses numbered 10,699 while Union losses numbered 13,047. At Gettysburg, Union losses numbered 23,049 while the Confederate losses numbered more than 33% of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia with 28,063.

184 Larry Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle that Changed the War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 323. All figures include Killed, Wounded, and Missing.
killed, wounded, and missing. The losses in the Red River Campaign were not nearly so great.

Taylor managed simultaneously to force Banks into a retreat and force Porter’s fleet to withdraw back down a river that had given them so many problems trying to ascend. With the bulk of Taylor’s army facing Banks, he could only manage minor skirmishes with Porter and his fleet. Minor as they were, with the help of the river, Taylor managed to inflict a great deal of damage on Porter’s fleet. The Union Army lost the expensive hospital boat Woodford and the transports Emma, City Belle, and John Warner. The Navy lost the two transports Champion No.3 and Champion No.5, an ironclad (Eastport), and two tinclads (Signal and Covington), and suffered 200 casualties. Add to this Porter’s loss of 28 Naval guns, and the Confederates fared much better than the Union.

Banks’ army suffered losses in both human resources and material. Including skirmishes, he lost 5,200 men. Those losses were compounded with the loss of 187 wagons and ambulances loaded with supplies, 1,007 draft animals,


187 Ibid.
and 2,500 cavalry mounts. (See Table 1)

Table 1. Union and Confederate losses in the Red River Campaign.\textsuperscript{188}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Confederate</th>
<th>Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>4275</td>
<td>5412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Guns:**          |             |             |
| Net Loss           | 0           | 57 (Including Naval) |
| Net Gain           | 17–26       | 0           |

| **Wagons:**        |             |             |
| Gross Loss         | 50 (est.)   | 822 (Govt. owned only) |
| Net Gain           | 600 (est.)  | 0           |

| **Cavalry Mounts and Draft Animals (Gross Loss)** |   |   |
|                                                    | 700 (est.) | 3502 |

| **Vessels**       |             |             |
| 3 (River Steamers) | 9 (Including Gun Boats) |

Bank’s loss was not only his campaign. His reputation and his political future collapsed before his eyes.

Newspapers from New York to London had accounts of the disastrous campaign. The \textit{New York Times} questioned the importance of the campaign. The newspaper wondered what Banks would do upon capturing Shreveport.

\textit{They cannot march across the vast spaces of Texas...for General Banks fruitless marching and}

\textsuperscript{188} Johnson, 278.
countermarching...that fatal region has cost us enough blood and treasure. ¹⁸⁹

In a May article the Times stated “No one is to blame but Banks for this campaign.”¹⁹⁰ This article went on to clear Banks’ former Chief of Staff General Stone, whom Banks personally blamed for the failure and replaced with General Dwight. The London Times reported the defeat and the withdrawal of Banks in their daily America section. It was becoming clear that Banks’ name was becoming synonymous with failure and military incompetence. General Grant, in his memoirs, decided “not to speak ill of Banks.”¹⁹¹

Even Banks’ friends and colleagues could only regard his campaign as a complete failure. Admiral Porter wasted little time in his commentary regarding Banks’ action during the campaign. In his report to Gideon Wells, Porter wrote:

> The Army here has met with a great defeat, no matter what the generals try to make of it. With the defeat has come demoralization, and it will take some time to reorganize and make up the deficiencies in killed and prisoners. The whole affair has been mismanaged...There is a faint attempt to make a victory out of this, but two or three such victories would cost us our existence.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 4 May 1864, 4
¹⁹² Taylor, 174.
To the men of his command it had been a useless waste of their blood and labor. Banks had to suffer the humiliation of having his troops hiss at him as he rode by during the retreat.\footnote{Johnson, 283.} The final blow to Banks was when he found his new superior officer, General Edward Canby, waiting for him in Simmesport. This was the last time he was allowed to command troops in the field. He was demoted to Canby’s assistant. He was now, in short, little more than a head clerk in General Canby’s Military Division of West Mississippi.\footnote{Ibid., 284.}

Taylor fared somewhat better than Banks. His relationship with General Smith became strained after his victories at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. After Pleasant Hill, Smith dispatched Churchill’s Division to Arkansas, leaving Taylor with 1,500 men to pursue Banks and Porter.\footnote{Taylor, 188-189.} Smith was still consumed with the northern operation in Arkansas. Taylor felt that Smith’s decision to forgo the pursuit of Banks far exceeded his normal level of stupidity. After all, Taylor still held Smith responsible for his failed LaFourche operation. The Federal Army and Navy were in full retreat and proceeding...
down a river, whose level continued to fall. Taylor considered the capture or destruction of both a possibility. He wrote,

In vain had all this been pointed out to General Kirby Smith when he came to me at Pleasant Hill in the night after the battle. Granted he was alarmed for Shreveport, sacred to him and his staff.\(^{196}\)

Taylor felt that if Smith had concentrated his forces against Banks, they could have captured the fleet and the army. This would have allowed the opening of the Mississippi River and possibly led to the freeing of New Orleans. He also felt that the victorious troops in the Trans-Mississippi Department would have been able to reinforce Georgia against Sherman’s march. “The people might have been spared the humiliation of defeat, and the countless woes and wrongs inflicted on them by their conquerors.”\(^{197}\)

Taylor’s view was on the extreme end of what might have been. Porter and Banks would have certainly been able to destroy the fleet before it fell into Confederate hands. That would have deprived Taylor of the very asset that he,

\(^{196}\) Ibid., 189.

\(^{197}\) Ibid.
and the Confederate Government, needed to open the Mississippi River and capture and reoccupy New Orleans.

The strained relationship between Taylor and Smith culminated in a series of communications between the two that resulted in Taylor losing his temper. He denounced Smith’s strategy and his conduct. He wrote:

> Your strategy has riveted the fetters on both of us….Your skill…which failed to use at all, either in the fight or pursuit, a force of over 7,000 cavalry, succeeded the strategy which declined the capture of Banks’ army and Porter’s fleet to march after the comparatively insignificant force of Steele….The grave errors you have committed in the recent campaign may be repeated if the unhappy consequences are not kept before you.\(^{198}\)

Smith could not ignore the insubordination of Taylor and, on June 10\(^{th}\), placed him under arrest. Smith also dispatched a letter to Jefferson Davis explaining the circumstances of his decision.\(^{199}\)

Taylor’s fortunes had already begun to turn. On the day Smith ordered his arrest, the Confederate Congress passed a resolution honoring Taylor and his men for their victories at Pleasant Hill and Mansfield.\(^{200}\) Later that summer Taylor was transferred from Smith’s command and ordered east of the Mississippi to take command of the

---


\(^{199}\) Ibid., 540-48.

\(^{200}\) Ibid., 597.
Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana. Along with the transfer came a promotion to Lieutenant General. This was the rank and the command he held until the end of the war.\textsuperscript{201}

The campaign itself accomplished nothing but a great loss of property and lives. But who was at fault for the campaign’s failure? As Commander-in-Chief, President Lincoln was ultimately responsible for the failure. Lincoln allowed political pressure from New England manufacturers to cloud his judgment in allowing the campaign to proceed.

All chief military personnel behind the operation were culpable to some degree. General Halleck had played a key role in planning the campaign, insisting that the operation take place and which route it should take. General Grant after he became General-in-Chief, should have either cancelled the expedition completely or loosened the time restrictions that had been placed on Banks regarding the return of Sherman’s troops. Most operational limitations that are put on field commanders only increase the chances of failure. In Banks’ case he was already prone to failure and did not need any other problems.

Once the campaign began several key mistakes led to

\textsuperscript{201} Johnson, 282.
its failure. Banks committed his first serious mistake when he took the wrong road at Grand Ecore and led his army away from his supply line and naval support. Ignorance of the countryside is no excuse for Banks. The army was at Grand Ecore for five days; Banks himself was there for three days. If he lacked time for an extended reconnaissance of the area, he should at least have interrogated the local population. The fact that inquiries were not made indicates a lack of vigilance on Banks’ part. While in Alexandria, Banks allowed himself to get caught up in the world of political intrigue, staying in town to collect cotton.

Banks’ second mistake came when he allowed his lines to be stretched along a narrow road, with wagons in between the advancing columns and his supporting units, blocking any advance in the event of an attack. This decision alone resulted in the loss or capture of the bulk of Confederate contraband.

Banks did not feel he deserved the brunt of the blame. He did accept, however, as any operation commander should, the responsibility for the failed operation. He managed to place the blame for that failure upon other members of his command. He blamed Porter and the Navy for the delay in

\footnote{Johnson, 143.}
Alexandria. He felt their quest for contraband cotton delayed their movement over the rapids. The fact that he arrived in Alexandria already behind schedule must have escaped him in his report. As for the marching order on the road to Mansfield, he criticized General Franklin and placed the fault on his shoulders.²⁰³

Banks even managed to criticize the command structure that he had to deal with. He complained about the lack of a unified command. Regarding Steele Banks wrote, “I never received the authority to give him [General Steele] orders...my instructions limited me with communication only.”²⁰⁴ As I said before, one of the problems of the campaign was that Halleck failed to appoint an overall Field Commander. That was his fault. Banks, by being Commander of the Department of the Gulf was, by default, the overall Commander of the operation. It should not have been necessary to point that out to the other principal leaders involved. The fact that the Commanders failed to communicate effectively with each other is their fault. That aspect of the campaign blame should be distributed evenly among Banks, Porter, A.J. Smith, and Steele.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 216.
Admiral Porter himself was also not without blame. He misjudged the usefulness and capabilities of his own fleet along with Banks’ intelligence. His decision to spearhead his fleet at Alexandria with the Eastport, his heaviest ironclad, was questionable given the waterway. He left behind lighter vessels that he knew could not make it over the falls, yet he proceeded with his heaviest one. That made very little sense. If it had not been for the ingenuity of Lt. Col. Bailey, the entire Mississippi Squadron and Bank’s army would have been stranded at Alexandria. That point was emphasized in Porter’s final report. He wrote,

Words are inadequate to express the admiration I feel for the abilities of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey. The is without doubt the best engineering feat performed...he has saved the Union a valuable fleet, worth nearly $2,000,000.205

The sinking of the transports along with the naval jam were all foreseeable events that could have been avoided with proper planning.

The campaign delayed the end of the war by a number of weeks by keeping thousands of troops away from Sherman, and by delaying the more decisive movement against Mobile. As for Louisiana itself, time was running out. A year after the Confederate victory at Mansfield and Pleasant

205 O.R. 34, pt.1, 221-222.
Hill, General Lee surrendered to General Grant at Appomattox Courthouse. A week and half later news of the Confederate defeat reached Shreveport.\textsuperscript{206} On April 20\textsuperscript{th}, the news of Lincoln’s assassination reached Louisiana. On the 21\textsuperscript{st}, General Kirby Smith announced to the Trans-Mississippi Department that Lee and the Confederate Government had surrendered.\textsuperscript{207} He emphasized that, as far as he was concerned, the Confederate hopes rested on their shoulders. He announced to his troops:

\begin{quote}
With you rests the hopes of our nation, and upon your action depends the fate of our people...prove to the world that your hearts have not failed in the hour of disaster...stand by your colors.\textsuperscript{208}
\end{quote}

While Smith was addressing his troops, a dispatch from Union General John Pope was in route to Smith’s command. The correspondence included a copy of the surrender agreement between Lee and Grant. Pope granted Smith and his men the same terms that had been granted to Lee. He encouraged Smith to, “avoid needless bloodshed, destruction, and misery by accepting the surrender terms.”\textsuperscript{209}

On May 9\textsuperscript{th}, Smith rejected Pope’s offer and wrote to the
governors within his district claiming that his army was well equipped to carry on the Confederate cause. He ended the dispatch by requesting that the governors call a special session for their input on how to proceed. On the 13\textsuperscript{th}, the governors met and advised Smith to agree to the terms of the surrender. That same day Smith informed his worn-out troops that the war was over and they were free to return to their homes.

\footnote{Ibid.}
Appendix

Organization of Federal and Confederate Armies

Company---A unit of troops, usually commanded by a Captain. This is the lowest organizational unit within both military organizations. A Company included approximately 100 men. Other Company positions included; one First Lieutenant, one Second Lieutenant, one First Sergeant, four Sergeants, eight Corporals, and two musicians. Officers were elected within most of the volunteer units.

Regiments---A unit of troops, usually commanded by a Colonel. Regiments were composed of 5-10 Companies.

Brigades---A unit of troops, usually commanded by a Brigadier General. Brigades were composed of 2-5 Regiments. Confederate Brigades were known for their Commanders or former Commanders. Example would be “Parson’s Brigade” at Pleasant Hill. Confederate average was 4.5 Regiments per Brigade.

Division---A unit of troops, usually commanded by a Major General. Divisions usually consisted of 2-5 Brigades. Confederate Divisions averaged 8,700 officers and enlisted.

Corps---Adopted on 6 Nov 1862. A unit of troops, usually commanded by a Lieutenant General. Corps usually consisted of 2-5 Divisions. Confederate Corps were larger than Union Corps.

The sources for the above information was obtained from Mark Boatner’s Civil War Dictionary and Herman Hattaway’s Shades of Blue and Gray: An Introductory Military History of the Civil War.
Armies---The largest operational organization; comprised of 2 or more Corps and commanded by a full General. Confederate Armies were named for the state or region they were activated in.
# Federal and Confederate Rank Structure

## Enlisted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Pvt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>Cpl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Sgt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sergeant</td>
<td>1st. Sgt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Officer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>2nd. Lt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>1st. Lt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Maj.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Col.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Lt. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>Gen.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Confederate Forces
Trans-Mississippi Department
General Kirby Smith

District of Louisiana
Major Gen. Richard Taylor

1st Infantry Division—Major Gen. John G. Walker, Walker's Texas Brigade

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thomas N. Waul
12th Texas Infantry—Col. Overton C. Young
18th Texas Infantry—Col. Wilburn H. King
22nd Texas Infantry—Col. Richard B. Hubbard
13th Texas Cavalry, Dismounted—Col. Anderson F. Crawford
11th Texas Infantry—Col. Oran M. Roberts
14th Texas Infantry—Col. Edward Clark
6th (Gould's) Texas Cavalry Battalion—Lt. Col. Robert S. Gould

Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. William R. Scurry
3rd Texas Infantry—Col. Phillip N. Luckett
16th Texas Infantry—Col. George Flournoy
17th Texas Infantry—
19th Texas Infantry—Col. Richard Waterhouse, Jr.
16th Texas Cavalry, Dismounted—Col. William Fitzhugh

First Division Artillery
Haldeman's Battery
Gibson's Battery
Daniel's Battery
Cornay's Battery

2nd Infantry Division—Jean Jacque Alfred Alexander Mouton, Camille J. Polignac

1st Brigade—Col. Henry Gray
18th Louisiana Consolidated Infantry—Col. Leopold L. Armant
28th Louisiana Infantry--Maj. Thomas W. Pool
Consolidated Crescent Regiment--Maj. Thomas W. Pool

2nd Brigade--Lt. Col. Robert D. Stone
15th Texas Infantry--Lt. Col. Robert D. Stone
17th Texas Consolidated Cavalry, Dismounted--Col. James R. Taylor
22nd Texas Cavalry, Dismounted--Maj. George W. Merrick
31st Texas Cavalry, Dismounted--Maj. Frederick J. Malone
34th Texas Cavalry, Dismounted--Lt. Col. John H. Caudle

Churchill's Division--Brig. Gen. Thomas James Churchill

First Division--Gen. James C. Tappan

Tappan's Brigade--Col. H. L. Grinstead
19th (Dawson's) & 24th Arkansas Infantry--Col. R. G. Shaver
33rd/24th Arkansas Infantry--Col. H. L. Grinsted

Gause's Brigade--Col. Lucien C. Gause
26th Arkansas Infantry--Lt. Col. Iverson L. Brooks
32nd Arkansas Infantry--Lt. Col. William Hicks
36th Arkansas Infantry--Col. James M. Davie

Second Division--Brig. Gen. Mosby M. Parsons

8th Missouri Infantry--Col. Charles S. Mitchell
9th Missouri Infantry--Col. Richard H. Musser

Second Brigade--Col. Simon P. Burns
10th Missouri Infantry--Col. William M. Moore
11th Missouri Infantry--Lt. Col. Thomas H. Murray
12th Missouri Infantry--Col. William M. Ponder
9th Missouri Battalion Sharpshooters--Maj. Lebbeus A. Pindall
Artillery--Etter's Arkansas Artillery Battery

Bee's Brigade--Brig. Gen. Hamilton P. Bee
1st Texas Cavalry--Col. Augustus C. Buchel
26th Texas Cavalry--Col. Xavier B. Debray
Terrell's Texas Cavalry--Col. Alexander W. Terrell

Major's Division

Lane's Brigade--Col. Walter P. Lane
1st Texas Partisan Rangers--Lt. Col. R. P. Crump
2nd Texas Partisan Rangers--Col. Isham Chisum
2nd Regt., Arizona Brigade--Coo. George W. Baker
3rd Regt., Arizona Brigade--Lt. Col. George T. Madison

Bagby's Brigade--Col. Arthur P. Bagby
4th Texas Cavalry--Col. William P. Hardeman
5th Texas Cavalry--Maj. Hugh A. McPhaill
7th Texas Cavalry--Lt. Col. Philemon T. Herbert, Jr.
13th Texas Cavalry Battalion--Lt. Col. Edward Waller, Jr.

Vincent's Brigade--Col. William G. Vincent
2nd Louisiana Cavalry--Maj. Winter O. Breazeale
4th (7th) Louisiana Cavalry--Col. Louis Bush
Horse Artillery--Maj. Oliver J. Semmes
Grosse Tete Flying Artillery Battery
McMahan's Texas Artillery Battery
Moseley's Texas Artillery Battery
Valverde Artillery Battery
Federal Forces
DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF
NATHANIEL P. BANKS

13TH ARMY CORPS (DETACHMENT)
BRIG. GEN. THOMAS E. G. RANSOM

Third Division--Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron

First Brigade--Lt. Col. Aaron M. Flory
    46th Indiana Infantry--Capt. William M. DeHart
    29th Wisconsin Infantry--Major Bradford Hancock

Second Brigade--Col. William H. Raynor
    24th Iowa Infantry--Major Edward Wright
    28th Iowa Infantry--Col. John Connell
    56th Ohio Infantry--Capt. Maschil Manring

Artillery
    1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery A--Lt. Col. Elisha Cole
    Ohio Light Artillery, 2nd Battery--Lt. William H. Harper

Fourth Division--Col. William J. Landram

First Brigade--Col. Frank Emerson
    77th Illinois Infantry--Lt. Col. Lysander R. Webb
    67th Indiana Infantry--Major Francis A. Sears
    19th Kentucky Infantry--Lt. Col. John Cowan
    23rd Wisconsin Infantry--Major Joseph E. Greene

    130th Illinois Infantry--Major John B. Reid
    48th Ohio Infantry--Lt. Col. Joseph W. Lindsey
    83rd Ohio Infantry--Lt. Col. William H. Baldwin
    96th Ohio Infantry--Lt. Col. Albert H. Brown

Artillery
    Indiana Light Artillery, 1st Battery--Capt. Martin Klauss
    Chicago Mercantile Battery--Lt. Pinkney S. Cone
19TH ARMY CORPS
MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM B. FRANKLIN

First Division--Brig. Gen. William H. Emory

First Brigade--Brig. Gen. William Dwight
153rd New York Infantry--Col. Edwin P. Davis
116th New York Infantry--Col. George M. Love
114th New York Infantry--Lt. Col. Henry B. Morse
29th Maine Infantry--Col. George L. Beal

Second Brigade--Brig. Gen. James W. McMillan
15th Maine Infantry--Col. Isaac Dyer
47th Pennsylvania Infantry--Col. Tilghman H. Good
13th Maine Infantry--Col. Henry Rust, Jr.

Third Brigade--Col. Lewis Benedict
30th Maine Infantry--Col. Francis Fessenden
173rd New York Infantry--Col. Lewis M. Peck
165th New York Infantry--Lt. Col. Gouverneur Carr

Artillery
First Delaware Battery--Capt. Benjamin Nields
Battery L, 1st US Artillery--Lt. Franck E. Taylor
First Vermont Battery--George T. Hebard

16TH ARMY CORPS
BRIG. GEN. ANDREW J. SMITH

First Division

Second Brigade--Col. Lucius F. Hubbard
47th Illinois Infantry--Col. John D. McClure
5th Minnesota Infantry--Major John C. Becht
8th Wisconsin Infantry--Lt. Col. John W. Jefferson

Third Brigade--Col. Sylvester G. Hill
35th Iowa (non-veterans 8th & 12th Iowa attached)--Lt. Col. William B. Keeler
33rd Missouri non-veterans, 11th Missouri attached)--Col. William H. Heath
**Third Division**

**First Brigade**—Col. William F. Lynch
58th Illinois Infantry—Major Thomas Newlan
119th Illinois Infantry—Col. Thomas J. Kinney
89th Indiana (non-veterans, 52nd Indiana attached)—Col. C. D. Murray

**Second Brigade**—Col. William T. Shaw
14th Iowa Infantry—Lt. Col. Newbold
27th Iowa Infantry—Col. James J. Gilbert
32nd Iowa Infantry—Col. John Scott
24th Missouri (non-veterans, 21st Missouri attached)—Major Robert W. Fyan

**Third Brigade**—Col. Risdon M. Moore
49th Illinois Infantry—Thomas W. Morgan
178th New York—Col. Edward Wehler

**Artillery**
3rd Indiana Battery—Capt. James M. Cockefair
9th Indiana Battery—Capt. George R. Brown

**Cavalry Division**—Gen. Albert L. Lee

**First Brigade**—Col. Thomas J. Lucas
14th New York Cavalry—Major Abraham Bassford
16th Indiana Mounted Infantry—Lt. Col. James H. Redfield
2nd Louisiana Mounted Infantry—Maj. Alfred Hodsdon

**Third Brigade**—Col. Harai Robinson
1st Louisiana Cavalry (US)—Major Algernon S. Badger
87th Illinois Mounted Infantry—Lt. Col. John M. Crebs

**Fourth Brigade**—Col. Nathan A. M. "Goldlace" Dudley
2nd Illinois Cavalry—Major Benjamin F. Marsh, Jr.
3rd Massachusetts Cavalry (31st Massachusetts Mounted Infantry)—Lt. Col. Lorenzo D. Sargent
2nd New Hampshire Cavalry (8th New Hampshire Mounted Infantry)—Lt. Col. George A. Flanders

**Fifth Brigade**—Col. Oliver R. Gooding
18th New York Cavalry, Cos. K & D—Capt. William Davis
3rd Rhode Island Cavalry (detachment)—Major George R.
Davis 2nd New York Veteran Cavalry (?)--Col. Morgan H. Chrysler

**Artillery**

Rawles' Battery (Battery G, 5th US Light Artillery)--Lt. Jacob B. Rawles
6th Missouri Cavalry, Howitzer Battery--Capt. H. H. Rottakan
Bibliography Page

Government Documents


Newspapers

New York Times
London Times
New York Tribune

Primary Sources

Books:

Flinn, Frank M. Campaigning With Banks in Louisiana, ’63 and ’64, and With Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley in ’64 and ’65. Boston: W.B. Clarke, 1889.


**Articles:**


Steers, Edward., ed. “Garrison Duty in Alexandria: The


Secondary Sources

Books:


Hattaway, Herman. Shades of Blue and Gray: An
Introductory Military History of the Civil War.

Hearn, Chester G. The Capture of New Orleans, 1862.


Van Doren Stern, Philip. The Confederate Navy: A Pictorial


Articles:


_______ The London Times, 15 May 1864, 7.


Manuscripts


Ware, Sarah F. “General Banks’ Red River Campaign.” M.A. Thesis, University of Texas Austin, 1931.